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FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE: SUPREME COURT RULES
THAT UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS ARE SUBJECT
TO SUIT WHERE "DOING BUSINESS"
I N Denver & R.G.W.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen'
the Supreme Court held that for general venue purposes the resi-
dence of a multi-state unincorporated association includes not only
its principal place of business, but also any district in which it may
be found to be "doing business." Denver & Rio Grande Western
Railroad brought an action against the Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen to recover losses incurred as the result of an illegal strike
by the Brotherhood.2 The union's motion to dismiss for improper
venue was denied by the district court and the railroad secured
damages.3 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
reversed, holding that under the applicable general venue statute,
section 1391 (b), venue properly lay only in Ohio where the union
had its principal place of business.4 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari and reversed the decision of the Tenth Circuit, holding
that the circuit court had incorrectly applied section 1391 (b). The
case was remanded to the district court for consideration of the
"doing business" question, and for determination of the applicability
of the 1966 amendments to the general venue provisions should the
union be found not to be doing business in Colorado.
At common law the unincorporated association was viewed as a
group of individuals rather than a legal entity, and hence to sue an
association one had to join all of its members.5 In United Mine
Workers v. Coronado Coal CompanyO the Supreme Court held that
such associations may be sued as separate entities where jurisdiction
is grounded upon a federal question, a holding now embodied in
1 387 U.S. 556 (1967).
'Id. at 557; see Denver & R.G.W.R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 185 F.
Supp. 369 (D. Colo. 1960), aff'd, 290 F.2d 266 (10th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S.
966 (1961) (strike permanently enjoined).
3 387 U.S. at 558.
' Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 867 F.2d 137 (10th Cir.
1966), rev'd, 387 U.S. 556 (1967).
5 E.g., Karges Furniture Co. v. Woodworkers Local 181, 165 Ind. 421, 423-24, 75 N.E.
877, 878 (1905); Picket v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 589-90, 78 N.E. 753, 760-61 (1906).
4 259 U.S. 844, 891 (1922).
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Rule 17 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Prior to 1942,
venue requirements also restricted suit of an unincorporated associa-
tion in cases arising under the laws of the United States, for the
entire membership was required to reside in a single district before
an association could be considered an "inhabitant" of that district,
and thus suable there.7 This stricture, and the requirement of
complete diversity jurisdiction, 8 resulted in immunity from suit in
federal court for most large unincorporated associations. In Sperry
Products Incorporated v. Association of American Railroads,9 how-
ever, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that un-
incorporated associations were to be viewed as independent entities
under a special venue statue governing patent cases, and that they
were "inhabitants" of the the district where their principal place
of business was located. Advancing policy considerations, Judge
Hand concluded that unincorporated associations should be treated
as corporations for general venue purposes as well. 10 At that time,
corporations were "inhabitants" of their principal place of business,
and subsequent cases extended Hand's result to unincorporated
associations under general venue statutes."
Neirbo Company v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation'12 in
effect, expanded corporate venue situs to include all places where
a corporation was licensed to do business, and in 1948 the venue pro-
visions of the Judicial Code were revised to codify this change and
further expand corporate venue to include districts in which a corpo-
ration could be said to be "doing business."'13 Neither the commit-
tee report 4 nor the revisor's notes to the Code changes 5 revealed
any evidence that, in enacting the new provisions, Congress had
considered the matter of venue for unicorporated associations. After
the 1948 amendments, a split of authority developed among the
7 See, e.g., Sutherland v. United States, 74 F.2d 89, 93 (8th Cir. 1934).
8 Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Act of 1948, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964); see United
Steelworkers Union v. R. H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145 (1965).
1132 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 744 (1943).
1 0 Id. at 411.
"1 See, e.g., Cherico v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 167 F. Supp. 635, 637-38
(S.D.N.Y. 1958); McNutt v. United Gas Workers, 108 F. Supp. 871, 875 (W.D. Ark.
1952); Salvant v. Louisville & N.R.R., 83 F. Supp. 391, 396 (W.D. Ky. 1949).
12308 U.S. 165 (1939).
' 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (c) (1964).
' H.R. RP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
SId. at A127. See also Hearings on H.R. 1600, 2055 Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 29 (1947).
district courts concerning whether the Sperry rationale-that un-
incorporated associations should be treated as corporations for venue
purposes-justified extension of the liberalized concept of corporate
venue to unincorporated associations.1" In Rutland Ry. v. Brother-
hood of Locomotive Engineers,'7 the first appellate consideration
of the problem, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found
the analogy between corporations and unincorporated associations
to be soundly drawn, and concluded that the residence of an associa-
tion for venue purposes should be expanded to include judicial
districts in which an association was "doing business."' 8  In the
present case, the district court found that venue was proper in that
district, applying the Rutland test.' 9 In reversing, the Tenth Cir-
cuit held that unincorporated associations were amenable to suit
only at the location of the principal place of business, concluding
that Rutland had been overruled sub silento by the Supreme Court
in United Steelworkers Union v. R. H. Bouligny, Incorporated,20
which held that an unincorporated association, unlike a corporation,
could not be treated as a "citizen" of the state of its principal place of
business. Any change toward treating the entities as equals, the
Supreme Court had remarked in that case, should be made by
Congress.2 '
In Denver & R.G.W.R.R. the Supreme Court distinguished
Bouligny, noting that it dealt with an extension of federal jurisdic-
tion without an affirmative grant from Congress.22  Venue, not
fraught with the same testy constitutional problems, "is primarily
a matter of convenience of litigants and witnesses,"n the Court con-
cluded. In rejecting the union's argument that if Congress had in-
tended to expand the venue situs of unincorporated associations, it
would have done so explicitly, the Court presumed that Congress had
26 Compare Cherico v. Brotherhood of R.R. Tiainmen, 167 F. Supp. 635, 637-38
(S.D.N.Y. 1958); McNutt v. United Gas Workers, 108 F. Supp. 871, 875 (W.D. Ark.
1952); Salvant v. Louisville & N.R.R., 83 F. Supp. 391, 396 (W.D. Ky. 1949), with
Eastern Motor Express, Inc. v. Espenshade, 138 F. Supp. 426, 432 (E.D. Pa. 1956), and
Portsmouth Baseball Corp. v. Frick, 132 F. Supp. 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
" 307 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1962).
8 Id. at 29.
29 See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 367 F.2d 137, 138
(10th Cir. 1966).
20382 U.S. 145 (1945) (Mr. Justice Fortas writing for the Court).
"2 Id. at 147, 150-51.
22 387 U.S. at 556, 563.
23 Id. at 560.
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been aware of the principle first enunciated in Sperry; i.e., that un-
incorporated associations should be treated as corporations for venue
purposes. The Court further reasoned that even if Congress had
not considered Sperry, the question of an unincorporated associa-
tion's residence for venue purposes and the conflict among the lower
federal courts remained unsettled. Congressional silence on the
residence question was interpreted as an invitation to the judici-
ary to continue application of the Sperry rationale. The ma-
jority noted that Congress must have realized the practical need
for making large unincorporated associations subject to suit wherever
they did business, as well as the inconvenience and unfairness which
would result if such organizations continued to be suable only under
the restrictive "principal place of business" rule. Justice Black, who
was joined in dissent by Justices Douglas and Fortas, questioned
whether Congress had been aware of Sperry at all, and particularly
whether Congress had taken its rationale, rather than its result, into
consideration when enacting section 1391 (C).24 The dissent quoted
Professor Moore's statement in his 1949 commentary on the Judicial
Code that section 1391 was not intended to change the venue pro-
visions with respect to unincorporated associations, 25 and pointed out
that the legislative history gave no indication that Congress had any
such change in mind in 1948. The dissent concluded that ultimately
the problem was "simply an important question of public policy...
and should be weighed by Congress and not by this Court."2 6
The dissent's argument, however, presupposes that the residence
of an unincorporated association for venue purposes was a settled
matter of law prior to 1948, a contention that the majority sum-
marily refuted.27 The absence of a legislative solution, which pre-
cipitated the Sperry decision, and later conflict among the lower
federal courts, supports the majority's argument that some resolution
of the question was demanded. Convenience to parties and wit-
nesses, as well as "fair play and substantial justice,"28 dictates similar
amenability to suit for multi-state unincorporated associations and
24 Id. at 567 (Black, J., dissenting).
2" Id. at 567-68, quoting J. MooRE, COMMENTARY ON THE U.S. JUDICIAL CODE 193
(1949).
21 387 U.S. at 569-70.
27 Id. at 561.
28See UMW v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 389 (1922); Comment, Unions as
Juridical Persons, 66 YALE L.J. 712, 714 (1957).
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corporations, which, though they differ in form, are cognate com-
mercial realities. Moreover, in the limited context of the Labor
Management Relations Act, Congress has recognized the desirability
of a "doing business" test of union availability to suit.29 Denver &
R.G.W.R.R. extends this logic to all multi-state associations doing
any business which raises federal questions.
29 Labor-Management Relations Act § 301 (c), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (c) (1964).
